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Abstract 
 
We study the relationship between the target’s recent peak prices and several aspects of merger 
and acquisition activity including offer prices, deal success, market reaction, and merger waves. 
Offer prices are biased toward the target’s recent peak prices although such prices are 
economically unremarkable. The offer’s probability of acceptance jumps discontinuously when it 
exceeds a peak price, a real effect of the use of peak prices. Conversely, bidder shareholders 
react more negatively as the offer price is influenced upward toward a peak price. Merger waves 
occur when high recent returns on the stock market and on likely targets make it easier for 
bidders to offer a peak price. The results are consistent with the use of recent peak prices as 
reference points or judgmental anchors for purposes of valuation.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 The price that a bidding firm offers for a target is generally the outcome of a negotiation 
with the target’s board. The standard textbook story emphasizes synergies. The offer price starts 
with an estimate of the increased value of the combined entity under the new corporate structure, 
deriving from cost reductions in labor or capital equipment, supply chain reliability, debt tax 
shields, market power, market access and expertise, improved management, internal finance, and 
other economic factors (e.g., Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) or Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2002)). This value gain is then divided between the two entities’ shareholders according to their 
relative bargaining power. In theory, the textbooks suggest, all of this leads to an objective and 
specific price for the target’s shares. 
In practice, valuing a company is subjective. A large number of assumptions are needed 
to justify any particular valuation of the combination.1 In addition, relative bargaining power 
may not be fully established. Boards can bluff in the negotiation. Other bidders may emerge. 
These real-life considerations mean the appropriate target price cannot be set with precision, but 
established only to be within a broad range. We hypothesize that this indeterminacy, in turn, 
creates space for the price offered and its reception to reflect other influences, in particular the 
psychological influences on the board of the target and the bidder and target shareholders, who 
ultimately must approve the price.  
In particular, we propose that salient but largely irrelevant reference point stock prices of 
the target play roles in merger and acquisition activity through both the prices and the types and 
quantities of firms traded. This psychological motivation has well-established roots in the 
anchoring-and-conservative-adjustment estimation method (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)), the 
salience of initial anchor positions in negotiations, and the prospect theory tenet that the utility of 
an outcome is a function of the outcome’s distance from a reference point. 
The reference point stock prices that we focus on are the peak prices that the target has 
achieved over various horizons, such as the 13-week high, 26-week high, and so on. The 52-
week high price, for example, is routinely reported and discussed in the financial press and is 
salient to executives, boards, and investors. Importantly, and in contrast to target shareholders’ 
individual cost bases, which represent other natural reference point prices for individuals, these 
                                                 
1 Those who teach valuation analysis in business schools are painfully familiar with this fact. 
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peak prices are reference prices that are common across stakeholders. We start with some 
anecdotes that suggest that practitioners do indeed give special weight to recent peak prices in 
target valuations: Target firm boards that are discouraging the deal often point out that the bid is 
below the recent high, while those that are encouraging the deal often note when the bid 
compares favorably with that price.  
We start by considering the relationship between recent peak prices and the offer price. 
Our results show a visually and statistically obvious effect of recent peak prices. Histograms of 
offer prices show spikes at the 13-week high, 26-week high, 39-week high, 52-week high, and 
104-week high. In other words, a peak price often serves not merely as a subtle psychological 
anchor but as one sufficiently heavy that there is no “adjustment” from it at all.  
These peak prices are of incremental importance to the offer price decision. Controlling 
for the 13-week high, the 26-week high price has a statistically and economically significant 
effect on offer prices, and the 39- and 52-week high prices also have independent explanatory 
power. Having documented that multiple reference points matter, we focus on the 52-week high 
for simplicity. For 52-week highs of a typical size, a 10% increase in the 52-week high is 
associated with a 3% increase in the offer premium.  
The effect of peak prices on offer prices survives a variety of control variables, 
robustness tests, and falsification tests. We examine the 52-week high’s effect on offer prices in 
various subsamples and consider non-psychological alternative explanations. Most notably, the 
52-week high could be proxying for the objective, but unobserved value gain from combination. 
That is, it is the value to which the target assets could return if only they were managed as well 
by the bidder in the future as they were by the target in the past. This agency- or information-
based hypothesis should perhaps be regarded as the null hypothesis. However, we find that the 
52-week high of the market index also has a strong effect on offer prices. Because the market 
component of the target’s 52-week high cannot be recovered merely by changing management, 
this hypothesis cannot, at least not fully, explain the 52-week high effect on offer prices.  
The second dimension of merger activity we consider is deal success—what distinguishes 
bids that succeed from those that fail, and in particular whether the offer price’s relationship to 
peak prices plays a role. Not surprisingly, higher offer prices are associated with higher 
probabilities of deal success; we control for this effect with a fourth-order polynomial of offer 
prices. The interesting finding is that an additional dummy variable indicates that the probability 
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of deal success increases discontinuously by 3% to 4% when the bidder makes an offer price 
even slightly above the target’s 52-week high.  
Bidder announcement effects have been extensively studied. One hypothesis is that they 
include the market’s estimate of overpayment. The offer premium itself is not a clean measure of 
overpayment, however, as better combinations may attract higher offer premia. The 52-week 
high is an ideal instrument for the effects of overpayment in mergers and acquisitions, separate 
from synergies or misvaluation in the bidder. We find that the bidder’s announcement effect 
becomes more negative with the target’s distance from its 52-week high. The bidder 
announcement effect is 2% to 3% worse for each 10% increase in the component of offer 
premium that is explained by the 52-week high. Given the strong connection between 52-week 
highs and offer prices, an interpretation is that shareholders of the bidder may view the bidder as 
more likely to be overpaying when the target has fallen far below this reference price.  
Apart from its impact on deal success and the value transfer in successful deals, high 
peak prices may deter bidders from appearing in the first place. The fourth and last aspect of 
merger activity that we examine is merger waves. It is well known that merger waves coincide 
with higher recent returns and stock market valuations. The potential link to reference price 
peaks is that higher market valuations mean that more targets are trading closer to their peak 
prices. Therefore, these reference points may become easier to satisfy (from the perspective of 
targets) and to justify (from the perspective of bidders) when valuations are high than when they 
have fallen. In this section, we use time-series data and so our tests are less refined. Not 
surprisingly, we find that the market’s 52-week high relative to its current value is inversely 
related to the level of merger activity. More interesting is that the 52-week high matters 
controlling for the past twelve individual monthly returns. The effects are somewhat stronger 
using the 52-week high premium on firms that ex ante have typical characteristics of targets. A 
comprehensive study of merger waves is beyond our scope; these results should be characterized 
as preliminary evidence that the use of peak prices plays a role in merger waves. 
To summarize, the use of reference point prices in mergers and acquisitions may shed 
light on phenomena that standard theories don’t fully explain. The most obvious is that they help 
to explain offer premia in a novel and economically significant fashion. The deal success and 
market reaction implications of reference points are also somewhat unique. There are several 
explanations for why merger volume and stock market valuations mover together, however, such 
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as the market timing theories of mergers by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004); our results provide an additional explanation. Reference points don’t shed 
light on the nature of deal synergies, although nor do market timing, agency, or overconfidence 
theories. Jovanovic and Rousseau’s (2002) Q-theory considers mergers as vehicles for 
technology transfer and capital reallocation, addressing the market valuations-merger waves link 
and incorporating a synergies story, but few other aspects of merger activity that we study.2 
Jensen’s (1986) agency theory has few overlapping predictions with reference points, nor do the 
managerial theories of Amihud and Lev (1981) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) or the 
overconfidence views of Roll (1986), Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007), and Malmendier 
and Tate (2008).3 An interesting difference between the reference point thinking and merger 
theories is that reference points embrace considerations of the target, rather than focus on the 
bidder alone or features of the combination. Of course, these are broad generalizations, and the 
literature on mergers and acquisitions is vast—see Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) for a 
comprehensive survey.  
Section II proposes some hypotheses based on the anchoring and adjustment 
phenomenon and briefly reviews related scientific and anecdotal evidence. Section III reviews 
the basic data. Sections IV, V, VI, and VII report how reference points affect offer prices, deal 
success, offer announcement effects, and merger waves, respectively. Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. The Psychology of Reference Points, Loss Aversion, and Anchoring and Adjustment  
The psychology of pricing is a recognized subfield of marketing research. There, the 
focus is on identifying prices or “price points” that lead to discontinuous jumps in demand. The 
M&A context has several parallels. The bidder wants to offer the lowest price that the target will 
accept: the target is the consumer to whom the bidder markets.  
Unlike in retail pricing, of course, the target shareholders in a merger transaction are 
selling not buying. The bidder is therefore looking for announced price points that will lead to 
discontinuous jumps in supply. We briefly review some of the psychology and economics 
relevant to the use of reference point prices.  
                                                 
2 See also Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2008), Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales 
(2000), and chapters in Kaplan (2000) on synergies and value enhancements. 
3 Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) survey behavioral theories of mergers (not including reference points) and 
Andrade and Stafford (2004) review non-behavioral theories.  
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A.  Reference Points, Loss Aversion, and Anchoring and Adjustment 
 The empirically-motivated prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identifies a 
departure from preference specifications that emphasize levels of goods and wealth as the sole 
drivers of value or utility. Their theory holds that changes in status relative to particular reference 
points are also a carrier of perceived value. The reference point in their theory is derived from 
the context at hand. It may be influenced by normatively-irrelevant frames of reference, or it may 
be based on an aspirational level or expectation as opposed to the status quo (Kahneman (1992)).  
 Another component of preferences that Kahneman and Tversky emphasize is loss 
aversion. This refers to a kink in prospect theory’s value function at its origin, specifically that 
losses are disliked more than equal-size gains are liked. Furthermore, they set the shape of their 
theory’s value function to include convexity in the domain of losses and concavity in gains to 
help it explain finer features of observed choice. To summarize, their value function is shaped 
like a kinked “S” and is defined over changes in value relative to a reference point.   
 The related phenomenon of anchoring and adjustment is associated with Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974). It refers to a belief formation process (not a utility perception) under which 
one begins at a specific initial value, salient but perhaps entirely irrelevant, and then adjusts 
toward a final estimate based on other considerations. The bias typically observed is that the final 
estimate is insufficiently adjusted from the initial value, hence its term “anchor.”  The bias may 
be used to advantage in negotiations. Kahneman (1992) notes that “negotiators commonly have 
an interest in misleading their counterpart about their reservation prices.… High claims and low 
offers are therefore made in the hope of anchoring the other side’s view of one’s true position…. 
The moral of studies of anchoring is that such efforts at deception can succeed … even when 
these messages are neither accepted nor even believed” (p. 309-310).  
 Economic applications of these ideas are plentiful. Neale and Bazerman (1991) consider 
the setting of union negotiations over wages and review strategems that appear to take advantage 
of the anchoring phenomenon. Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein (1996) similarly report on the 
self-serving use of comparison groups as reference points in wage bargaining. Camerer and 
Malmendier (2007) consider reference point effects in organizational economics generally. 
Northcraft and Neale (1987) show that the asking price affects estimates of the value of a house, 
even among professional real estate agents who claim to view it as uninformative; but List (2004, 
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2005) and Plott and Zeiler (2005) qualifies this with evidence that experience attenuates or 
eliminates the endowment effect.4  Genesove and Mayer (2001) find that homeowners’ cost 
bases significantly affects negotiations and thus outcomes of real estate transactions. The large 
literature on money illusion is based centrally on nominal reference point pricing.  
The use of reference points among investors and other financial actors appears, for 
example, in Shefrin and Statman (1985), who note that prospect theory and loss aversion imply 
that investors have a “disposition effect” and are reluctant to sell stocks showing paper losses. 
This effect is in Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Grinblatt and Han (2005), 
Ivkovich, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005), and Birru (2009).5 Shefrin and Statman (1984) 
suggest a view of dividends based on loss aversion and framing effects. Barberis, Huang, and 
Santos (2001) discuss asset pricing implications of prospect theory, and Barberis and Xiong 
(2009) emphasize that the 52-week high is a price where investors are particularly willing to 
realize gains. DeGeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) show that executives strain to exceed 
salient EPS thresholds. Baker and Xuan (2009) find that the price at which the CEO joined the 
company is a reference point for raising new equity. Loughran and Ritter (2002) propose that 
reference-point preferences and mental accounting help to explain IPO underpricing, a view 
tested by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005). Hart and Moore (2008) develop contracting theory 
based on parties’ use of anchoring and psychological reference points. 
Certain of these actions are efforts to cater to investors who notice reference points such 
as earnings per share and 52-week highs—for example, Huddart, Lang, and Yetman (2009) find 
stock market volume and price effects around this reference stock price, and Heath, Huddart, and 
Lang (1999) find that employee exercise of stock options doubles when their company’s stock 
price exceeds its 52-week high.  
 
B.  The Target 
In a sufficiently large merger or acquisition, the transaction must be approved by the 
management and shareholders of the target as well as those of the bidder. We start by discussing 
                                                 
4 In this connection, it is noteworthy that most executives and investors are not involved in merger transactions with 
any frequency, although their bankers may be.  
5 In unreported tests we considered the trading volume-weighted average price (e.g. Grinblatt and Han (2005)) as 
another reference price that may be relevant to merger activity. However, perhaps because of the inherent noisiness 
of our measure, as well as the fact that it pertains exclusively to target shareholders rather than a wider range of 
stakeholders, we found weaker results than those for the 52-week high.  
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empirical hypotheses that derive from the psychology outlined above. The most obvious 
application involves the disposition effect, or the reluctance to realize losses relative to a 
reference point. While for some investors the reference point is likely to be their purchase price, 
i.e. the disposition effect documented in papers mentioned above, other important reference 
points—and, importantly for our purposes, ones that are common across shareholders—are the 
firm’s recent peak prices. The 52-week high price, for example, is widely reported in the 
financial media. Furthermore, because it by definition is a fairly recent price, it seems attainable 
by target shareholders even in the absence of a merger. This logic predicts that targets are more 
likely to approve mergers in which the offer price approaches or exceeds a recent peak price. 
More subtly, the S-shaped value function predicts that the further is the current price from a 
recent high, the less influence the marginal dollar away from that reference will have in terms of 
the perception of losses. 
Belief formation via anchoring and adjustment may reinforce the utility effects—and at 
least three levels, two psychological and one practical. First, target shareholders must form an 
estimate of target value when deciding whether to accept the offer. Lacking time, information, 
and ability to accurately compute present values of future cash flows under alternative ownership 
and management scenarios, some of them will consult recent peak prices as references. Second, 
targets seek and attempt to justify the highest possible price. Whether or not the target board 
views it as relevant, a recent peak price can be used as a negotiating anchor. The 52-week high 
may be the highest salient and specific price at hand. Third, the target’s management and board 
faces a risk of shareholder litigation if they recommend selling at a price that is viewed as too 
low. That they did not sell below a recent peak price provides some rhetorical cover.  
 
C.  The Bidder 
 The bidder’s psychology can also be affected by anchoring and adjustment both directly 
and strategically. When pursuing a target, the bidder has to decide how much it is willing to pay, 
and that in turn depends on how it values the target. It is not possible to pin this down with 
certainty. An input to this estimation must be the target’s recent valuations, and as such its own 
recent peak prices may enter as anchors. The bidder may reason, if the target was valued at a 
certain level just a few months ago, shouldn’t we, with our ability to realize synergies, value it 
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near or above that same level? Thus a peak price can become an anchor, and as mentioned above 
insufficient adjustment from that level becomes the norm.  
 Reinforcing predictions arise from the fact that bidder management must justify their 
offer to shareholders and financiers. The management may reassure such stakeholders with the 
simple argument that the target was worth that price in the past and so, of course, it must be 
possible to realize that in the future. On the other hand, if the bidder’s investors do not think as 
hard as its board about the target’s potential valuation, they may be less biased by the anchoring 
phenomenon and so more likely to view peak-price-driven bids as overpaying.  
 And there is the bidder’s perception of the target’s psychology. Once a target valuation is 
established by any means, the bidder must estimate the minimum price that the target will accept. 
Boards may predict that the target’s 52-week high will be used both as a strategic anchor against 
them in negotiations and as a reference point that their own investors care about.6 Or, bidders 
may appreciate that targets want a “fair” offer and, knowing that targets have a biased notion of 
fairness (Babcock et al. (1995)), offer a recent peak price even if they view it as too high. 
 
D.  Anecdotes from Shareholder Communications  
 The 52-week high price is often cited in communications between managements and 
shareholders about pending mergers or acquisitions. It is also cited by the media as a simple 
yardstick with which to put the bid price in context. We mention three anecdotal examples here; 
the remainder of the paper provides a large sample analysis, but cannot provide as much color.  
The management of Taro Pharmaceutical Industries, in a July 28, 2008, amendment to its 
SEC SC 14D-9 filing recommending against the tender offer from Sun Pharmaceutical 
Industries, made the following statement: “Beyond what was written in the 14D-9, I would add 
only the obvious: that Sun’s offer of $7.75 per share is significantly below the price at which our 
shares are trading today, which is at a 52-week high, and even further below the price that Sun 
paid to get blocks of Taro shares in recent private transactions with investors. Given our 
performance year to date and our outlook, I believe the Sun offer significantly undervalues our 
Company and deprives you of what we believe your shares are worth.”  Left unmentioned is the 
fact that Sun’s bid itself contributed to Toro’s high price today.  
                                                 
6 In an interview with one of the authors, Gerald Rosenfeld, CEO of the investment bank Rothschild North America, 
stated that in his experience the target’s current price is the most important reference for valuation while the 52-
week high is the second-most critical reference.  
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The media often reinforce these claims. For example, on February 1, 2008, the Wall 
Street Journal reported, “Microsoft’s $31-per-share offer – $44.6 billion – represented a 62 
percent premium to Yahoo’s closing price late Thursday, although it’s below Yahoo’s 52-week 
high of $34.08 reached less than four months ago.”  The article failed to explain why an 
historical price more than 78% higher than the current price should be relevant, however. 
The 52-week high can of course also be cited as reason to embrace, not reject, an offer. 
Figure 1 shows an example slide from a shareholder presentation by Cablevision to its 
shareholders on October 24, 2007. In arguing for acceptance of the offer from the family which 
already controlled the company, Cablevision management highlights the fact that the bid price is 
at a premium to a variety of 52-week high and low prices, an appeal both to anchoring as an 
estimate of value and reference point utility.  
These anecdotes give some suggestive color to the salience of reference points to target 
agents and the media and the contexts in which they are employed. It is precisely because 
reference point prices may affect many stakeholders in a merger transaction—advisors, boards, 
and investors and financiers of both the bidder and the target—that we focus the empirical work 
on documenting the effects of reference point prices on specific merger outcomes. In other 
words, the odds of success in our empirical work increases from the numerous overlapping and 
reinforcing predictions noted above. At the same time this makes it difficult to provide a full 
attribution of our results to particular psychological mechanisms and negotiating strategies. 
 
III.  Data 
A.  Merger and Acquisition Sample 
The sample of deals is described in Table 1. Our source for mergers and acquisitions is 
Thomson Financial. We start with all unique deals (unique bids) where the announcement date is 
between January 1, 1984, and December 31, 2007, where the target is a public company, where 
the offer price is not missing, and where the bidder purchased at least 85% of the target firm 
shares outstanding or else the percentage acquired is unknown. We exclude deals that are 
missing an offer price or have been classified by Thomson as recapitalizations, repurchases, 
rumors, or target solicitations. These constitute the minimal set of exclusions required for our 
analysis. Of these deals, we were able to compute the target’s 52-week high price from CRSP for 
a final sample of 7,498.  
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We define the offer premium as the total consideration offered scaled by the target’s price 
as of 30 days prior to the announcement. Similarly, the 52-week target (market index) high is the 
52-week high stock price (market index) over the 365 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date expressed as a percentage difference from the CRSP stock price (market 
index) 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. The CRSP market index is formed using 
total market value-weighted returns. The purpose of scaling these prices by a common factor is 
to eliminate heteroskedasticity that would result from comparing them in raw form. The purpose 
of choosing a 30-day lagged price as this scaling factor is to attenuate any upward rumors or new 
information effect on the offer premium. See Schwert (1996) for the relationship between offer 
premia and pre-offer price runups.  
For all deals, Thomson gives information on whether the offer is a tender offer and 
whether the bidder is a financial buyer (LBO). For a subset of deals, we have information on the 
form of payment is cash, stock, or other, whether the deal is completed or withdrawn, and 
whether the bidder attitude is hostile, friendly, or neutral. Data on the form of payment and 
attitude of the deal are not available before 1990, but we are able to determine the form of 
payment for 4,361 deals and attitude for 4,346 deals, 220 of which were hostile. Of our main 
sample, 1,522 are tender offers and 192 are acquisitions by financial firms. It is likely that 
Thomson is underreporting these deals, particularly the frequency of leveraged buyouts in recent 
years. We keep track of the success of specific offers, not whether the target is ultimately 
acquired. Like Betton and Eckbo (2000), we are concerned with all bids, from the first to the last. 
Of the 6,926 deals that Thomson records as either completed or withdrawn, 26% are withdrawn. 
Of course, this includes situations where a competing or revised offer emerged, so the rate of 
overall success is much higher than these averages would indicate. 
 
B.  Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 reports means, standard deviations, medians, and extreme values for deal pricing, 
outcome variables, and control variables. Regarding prices, the median offer premium is 29.4%, 
the median 13-week high target price is 9.34%, etc. Peak prices increase monotonically with 
horizon, reaching a median of 30.10% over the past two years. The median 52-week high market 
price is 3.2%. These are all expressed in log terms. For the peak prices, which of course are 
positive by definition, we Winsorize at the 1% and 99% levels, but wide variation remains.  
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In addition to the primary variables of interest, we record secondary deal outcome 
variables in Panel B, and deal, target, and bidder characteristics in Panel C. All continuous 
variables among these are also Winsorized. We calculate the three-day announcement return of 
the bidder by compounding the daily holding period return from CRSP (CRSP: RET) centered 
on the announcement date from Thomson. The median is -0.81%. About 74% of the offers are 
successfully completed. 
The target and bidder characteristics are from standard sources. Return on equity is 
defined as net income (Compustat: NI) divided by shareholders’ equity (Compustat: SEQ). The 
return on assets is defined as net income (NI) divided by total assets (Compustat: AT). The book-
to-market ratio is defined as book equity divided by market equity, where book equity is total 
shareholders’ equity (Compustat: SEQ) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
(Compustat: TXDITC) minus the redemption value of preferred stock (Compustat: PSRKRV) 
and market equity is calculated by multiplying shares outstanding (CRSP: SHROUT) and price 
(CRSP: PRC) at fiscal year end. The earnings price ratio is defined as earnings before interest 
and taxes (Compustat: EBIT) divided by market equity (ME). Because not all target and bidder 
companies within the main sample of 7,498 deals were tracked by Compustat in the year before 
the announcement of the deal, we have financial ratios of the target for only 5,108 deals and of 
the bidder for only 2,048 deals.  
The price volatility, two-month return, and one-year return of the target are from CRSP. 
Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of daily returns for the 365 calendar days ending 
30 days prior to the announcement date. Returns are calculated by compounding the daily 
holding period return (CRSP: RET) for the appropriate period ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date. Market capitalization is price (CRSP: PRC) times shares outstanding 
(CRSP: SHROUT) from CRSP at the fiscal year end prior to Thomson’s announcement date.  
Panel C of Table 2 summarizes the our battery of controls. Over the sample period, 43% 
of the deals are financed with cash, 33% are financed with stock, 20% are tender offers, 5% are 
hostile, and 3% are acquired by financial firms. As one would expect, targets are generally 
financially weaker than bidders, including in valuation ratios with targets relatively more likely 
to be value firms. One explanation is, of course, that poorly-managed firms become targets (e.g., 
Lang and Stulz (1984) and Mitchell and Lehn (1990)).  
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IV. Bid Prices 
A.  Basic Results 
 We begin by documenting the effect of past peak prices on offer prices, because this 
relationship is central to the reference point perspective. Figure 2 simply plots the density of 
offer prices relative to the 13-, 26-, 39-, 52-, and 104-week highs. To keep the scale of the x-axis 
manageable, we do not plot offer premia that exceed 500% in absolute value.  
The plots show clear spikes at the 13-week high, 26-week high, 39-week high, 52-week 
high, and 104-week (two-year) high. The first price is weakly less than the second, which is 
weakly less than the third, and so on, so we will use regressions to verify the incremental 
importance of peaks at each horizon. What the figures are able to prove on their own is that it is 
common to offer exactly a recent peak price. To be clear, these peaks are not mechanically 
related to the offer price setting its own peak price, because the most recent peak price we allow 
is 30 days before the offer’s announcement. Whether a price is at or simply very close to the 52-
week high is not important economically.7 The takeaway from Figure 2 is that peak prices play 
specific roles, consistent with stories involving reference dependence. 
 Figure 3 presents a formal discontinuity analysis of the 52-week high (for brevity we 
focus on a single peak). Not only is the modal outcome equal to the 52-week high, but now 
another feature is revealed, which is that many other offers tend to collect just above the 52-week 
high. This is most apparent when we divide offers into fewer bins in Panel B. This jump in the 
distribution is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.01 or less.8  Panel A shows yet another 
interpretable feature. There is a slight decline in the density as we approach the 52-week high 
from below, and a surge as we pass it. Some bidders may reason that if they were already 
considering a bid around this level, they may as well push it to just above the 52-week high to 
increase the likelihood of acceptance—and this actually works, as we show later on.9   
                                                 
7 Actually, in our later analysis of the probability of offer acceptance, we find that even tiny differences in offer 
prices can affect economic outcomes.  
8 One concern is whether the discontinuity reflects discreteness in prices. Shares are quoted in sixteenths, eighths, 
and decimals in our sample. The 52-week high is a price that has been observed in the price history of the target, so 
it falls on what might naturally be a mass point. A few refined show that this is not driving our discontinuity results. 
A discontinuity is apparent even when we drop the bin that contains the 52-week high. The p-value is 0.016 in Panel 
A and below 0.000 in Panel B. We have also estimated a bootstrap p-value by computing z-statistics for 
discontinuities around randomly chosen past target stock prices. Using this distribution, we find a p-value of 0.013. 
9 One question is why any bidder would locate just below the 52-week high. This could reflect the bidder’s 
anticipation of a difficult negotiation and the preservation of a psychological “option value” of being able to cross a 
salient threshold as a “concession” in later rounds. Alternatively, mass here may be the result of stock deals—cash 
deals would have a more uneven mass on the left and right sides of the distribution; we study cash and stock deals 
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 The vast majority of offer prices of course do not equal the 52-week high. We examine 
the overall shape of the relationship between these prices nonparametrically in Figure 4. We 
estimate Gaussian kernel regressions of the model 
ittiit eWeekHighbaOffer ++= −30,52  
(1) 
with varying bandwidths and estimation points. 
 Both panels in the figure suggest that the offer premium rises by approximately 3 to 3.5% 
with every 10% increase in the 52-week high. Panel A limits the sample to situations where the 
52-week high is less than 50% higher than the pre-offer price. Beyond this level, with a long 
right tail and limited data, the estimated incremental effect of the 52-week high is much noisier 
and both statistically and economically weaker, as shown in Panel B. This might be consistent 
with the shape of the prospect theory value function—as “losses” increase, the marginal pain of 
additional loss decreases, so target shareholders may acquiesce more easily. Or, in a quasi-
rational argument, targets that have fallen substantially from their 52-week high may fail to 
persuade the bidder of its relevance.  
 The first columns of Table 3 report least-squares estimates of Eq. (1) and, with the 
nonlinearity of Figure 4 in mind, piecewise linear specifications: 
( )++= − 25,52min 30,1 tiit WkHibaOffer        (2) 
( )( ) ( ) ittiti eWkHibWkHib +−+− −− 7552,0max50,2552min,0max 30,330,2  
with standard errors are clustered by month. This specification allows for a marginal effect of b1 
for 52-week high premia up to 25%, b2 for premia between 25% and 75%, and b3 for premia 
above 75%. We scale the prices by the 30-day lagged price to reduce heteroskedasticity, but to 
the extent that investors and boards don’t think of these prices in terms of the 30-day lagged 
price, this practice can also lead to a type of measurement error that induces a spurious positive 
correlation. We therefore include the inverse of the 30-day lagged price in all specifications.  
The simple linear specification shows that offer prices rise about 1% for every 10% rise 
in the 52-week high. This is statistically significant but not large. The true size of the effect is 
masked by large outliers in the independent variable, which even when Winsorized includes 
observations with values exceeding 250%. The piecewise linear specifications address this. They 
show a magnitude similar to that suggested in Figure 4, with a 10% higher 52-week high 
                                                                                                                                                             
separately below. Or, the peak price that agents in a given deal focus on is a 13-week high, for example, which may 
by chance be near the 52-week high. In any case, such behavior is likely to make the outcome effects here weaker. 
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effecting a roughly 3.3% higher offer price over the typical range of 52-week highs. As the 52-
week high reference price exceeds 25%, however, it exerts a smaller influence, rising at 1.1% for 
each additional 10% increase in the 52-week high between 25% and 75%. Beyond 75%, the 
effect is approximately 0.7%. This pattern is consistent with the S-shaped value function of 
prospect theory, which implies that the further is the current price from the reference point, the 
less the marginal perceived loss. However, there are other explanations.  
 The remaining columns test whether there is a specific interval over which peak prices 
affect offer prices or whether peaks over several intervals have incremental explanatory ability. 
We start with the 13-week high as a baseline regressor and add “incremental” high regressors at 
13-week intervals until we reach back two years from the offer date. To estimate the incremental 
26-week high regressor, for example, we essentially take the residual of a first-stage regression 
of the 26-week high on the 13-week high. However, to allow for the incremental high to have a 
diminishing marginal effect, we run this model three times to estimate the residual effects in 
cases in which the 26-week high premium is below 25%, between 25% and 75%, and above 
75%. The header to Table 3 details the empirical approach.  
 As Figure 2 suggested, but could not show formally, there are incremental effects of peak 
prices well beyond that achieved in the most recent 13 weeks. As an example, consider a 
hypothetical Target A whose 13-week high (ending 30 days prior to a deal announcement) is 
10% higher than the period end price. Compare this target with another Target B whose 13-week 
high premium is 0%. All else equal, the offer price for Target A will be higher than the offer 
price for Target B by 4.2% to 4.3% on average. Subsequent peaks have reasonably distinct 
effects on the offer price. Extending the example, suppose that Target A’s 26-week high is 10% 
higher than one would expect, in a statistical sense, given its 13-week high and Target B’s 26-
week high is exactly what one would expect given its 13-week high. Then, the offer price for 
Target A would be higher by a further 2.4% to 2.9%. Incremental peaks beyond 52 weeks are 
generally not statistically significant, with an anomaly being the incremental effect of the 78-
week high.  
It is intuitive that long-past peaks are of progressively less relevance; the results here 
suggest that there is a decline after 13 weeks and then a considerable drop after 52 weeks. 
However, within the more recent period, a variety of peak prices matter. Having shown this, we 
focus on the 52-week high for the rest of the paper. We stress that this is for simplicity. There is 
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plenty of analysis left to do just with one price. To repeat, there are incremental effects at 
horizons within 52 weeks, the 52-week high appears not to be the magic number that it appears 
to be in some studies of volume and stock returns.    
The peak price effect does not arise just because it reflects target firm returns over a pre-
specified period. Table 4 adds controls for each of the twelve months ending at t-30.This is 
another effort to control for any effect of pre-offer runups on offer prices (Schwert (1996)). The 
peak price effects are little changed. This indicates, in another way, that it is the return since the 
52-week high, i.e. the 52-week high premium, that drives the results, not that past returns were 
low over some fixed interval.  
The last specifications in Table 4 help to evaluate a possible non-psychological 
alternative explanation. This explanation holds that the 52-week high price is particularly 
relevant because it represents a specific valuation that the bidder could hope to obtain by 
returning the target to “optimal” investment policy, where optimal is defined as the policies 
prevailing as of the time the high was reached, even in the absence of any synergies. This 
explanation seems inconsistent with the evidence on the importance of incremental peaks shown 
before. We evaluate this story further by replacing the target’s 52-week high premium with the 
overall stock market’s 52-week high. The fact that this is also a statistically and similarly 
economically significant predictor of offer prices casts more doubt on the alternative 
explanation—the bidder cannot hope to recapture the market component of the target’s 52-week 
high by returning to a particular investment policy. While simple and brief, this test gives sharp 
evidence for the importance of specific reference points. Like the spikes in Figure 1, the results 
are not natural predictions of other theories of offer premia. We do not wish to dismiss these 
theories, of course. What we have shown is that peak prices play an incremental role.  
If we take the sensitivity of the offer premium to the 52-week high as an arbitrary transfer 
of value, we can compute the total value transfer for our sample. For each the 5,135 completed 
deals in our sample, we multiply the 52-week high by the piecewise linear coefficients b in the 
second column to estimate the component of the offer premium that is driven by the 52-week 
high. To convert this quantity to dollars, we multiply it by the target market capitalization at t-30 
to arrive at the transfer. The total value transfer is $179 billion, $34.9 million per deal, or 18.0% 
of the total offer premium. Even under the assumption that the variation in the 52-week high is 
entirely arbitrary, we cannot clearly identify whether this is overpayment or underpayment 
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without knowing the stand-alone fundamental value of the targets and the value of synergies 
from the combinations. It is possible, for example, that on average the bidder gets a good deal, 
but overpays when the target 52-week high is especially large relative to its current price. 
 
B. Robustness and Other Subsamples 
 We report additional robustness and falsification tests in Table 5. We first examine the 
influence of characteristics of the proposed transaction itself—whether it is for cash, stock, 
hostile, a tender, or a financial bidder. Tender offers are associated with large increases in offer 
prices, while financial buyers are associated with lower (but still substantial) offer premia.10 
These control variables do not diminish the effect of the 52-week high, nor do they increase the 
total regression R2 as much as one might expect, presumably due to the relative scarcity of 
tenders and financial buyers in our sample.11 
We examine how the 52-week high effect compares with bidder and target firm 
fundamentals as key inputs to offer premia. We control for seven characteristics of the bidder 
and the target. Large bidders bid more, while large targets receive less, as is intuitive when one 
considers bids in dollar terms. A notable control for purposes of robustness is the target’s return 
volatility. This is correlated with the 52-week premium and other peaks and could reflect aspects 
of the target’s value to the bidder. Its significance as an incremental effect is not large; on the 
other hand, the dummies for tender offers and financial buyers are strong in both economic and 
statistical significance. While some of these controls are important determinants of offer prices, 
their inclusion does not appear to greatly reduce the effect of peak prices.  
The remaining columns conduct a falsification test. We look for a specific effect of the 
52-week high in another way. We ask whether that price, as the 100th percentile price over the 
past year, represents an effect distinct from the 90th percentile price, with which it is highly 
correlated. The results show that despite this high correlation, the 52-week high effect comes 
through. Furthermore, to the extent that the 90th percentile price also serves as an appropriate 
                                                 
10 See DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984) and Kaplan (1989) for early evidence on target shareholder gains in 
LBOs, and Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) for a more recent survey of restructurings and LBOs. 
11 Heron and Lie (2006) examine the effect of 18 variables on offer premia in a sample of 526 unsolicited takeover 
bids. The character of their sample is different, but they also find that only a small number of factors significantly 
affect takeover premia (largely related to the presence of poison pills and ownership structure). The most related 
result is that higher target returns over the prior year are associated with lower premia. We control for lagged returns 
much more flexibly in Table 4, but note that their result is consistent with the negative coefficients we estimate for 
most lagged returns. 
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proxy for fundamental valuation, this test, like that involving the market component of the 52-
week high, also casts doubt on the view that the 52-week high price effect reflects only that 
channel. Results are similar for the 80th, the 95th, and even the 99th percentile of the target past 
stock price distribution. Taken together, the figures and tables to this point provide convincing 
evidence that offer prices are influenced by past peaks.  
 Results for a variety of subsamples are in Table 6. The first column shows that the effect 
is stronger in tender offers. Because a tender offer is an appeal directly to target shareholders, 
this reflects the perception of the bidder of the relevance of the reference point to target 
shareholders, as opposed to the outcome of a negotiation with the target board or its advisors. A 
related effect, perhaps, involves the attitude of target management. Hostile offers’ prices are a bit 
more influenced by the 52-week high than friendly offers when the 52-week premium is 
relatively high. This could also relate to an effort to appeal directly to target shareholders. 
 Reference points have similar effects on first offer and subsequent offers. (Most offers in 
the sample are first offers, and indeed last offers also because most offers are successful. Be 
mindful that what we can observe are public first offers. Boone and Mulherin (2007) show that 
on the order of half of targets are sold in a competitive auction process that takes place prior to 
the first public offer; in other words, we often observe the outcome of that process.)  The success 
of the offer itself, while clearly endogenous as we show later (when we study the effect of the 
offer price on the probability of success), provides an interesting sample split. Within the sample 
of successful offers, bids more strictly adhere to the 52-week high price.  
 The form of payment is relevant to the reference point effect, although the interpretation 
of the results is not unambiguous. The offer price in stock deals is more prone to reflect the 52-
week high when that price is relatively modest, while cash deals are more responsive to it when 
it is higher, in other words when the target has recently fallen more sharply. One possibility is 
that this reflects the communication between bidders and their cash-providing bankers. The 
bidders could be justifying the offer price in part on the basis of the target’s recent high. 
 The effect is strong in both halves of the sample, but somewhat lower in the latter half. It 
is hard to know, but the second half result might reflect somewhat more detailed due diligence or 
the increasing ease of sophisticated analysis and valuation modeling. On the other hand, the 
effect has actually increased for medium-size 52-week high premia. Moreover, in unreported 
results, we consider large (above the median cap of $100 million) and small targets separately. 
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The effect is actually quite a bit stronger for large targets, including the effect of the market’s 52-
week high. In light of the strong results both for recent years and within large firms, the 
empirical effects seem to be of ongoing economic importance. 
 
V. Deal Success  
 The previous tests address the division of value between the bidding and target 
shareholders. Another important question is whether peak pricing affects deal success, leading to 
“real” economic effects via capital reallocation. While evidence exists that investor psychology 
affects numerous financial decisions such as corporate and mutual fund name changes, dividend 
policy, nominal share pricing, and financing choices, strong evidence of behavioral phenomena 
having real effects is not plentiful.12  A second feature of this analysis is that, like the tender 
offer differential in the subsamples table, it focuses on the reception of the bid by the target’s 
management, board, investors, and advisors. It thus may identify another aspect of merger 
activity sensitive to anchoring and reference point utility considerations of those agents as 
opposed to those of the bidder.  
 The precision of our prediction here makes for a straightforward test for such real effects, 
and earlier anecdotes suggest that this is a plausible hypothesis. Suggestive of such an effect, the 
probability of success across our sample is 69.9% if the offer price is below the 52-week high 
and 76.9% if it is above.13  Table 7 tests for a discontinuity in a probit regression. Where S = 1 if 
the deal is successful, we model 
( ) ( ) ittiitit eWkHiOffercbOfferaSpr +>++= −30,52              (3)  
including control variables.14 One might expect that higher offer premia are associated with 
higher probabilities of success, as in e.g. Heron and Li (2006). This specification allows us to 
control for the level of the offer premium, unlike the cross-tab just reported, and thus to test 
                                                 
12 An exception is Polk and Sapienza (2009) who propose that catering to investor sentiment directly affects 
corporate investment. 
13 Bear in mind that this is the success of a particular offer, not the overall rate of success in selling the target to a 
given bidder.  
14 See Comment and Schwert (1995) and Heron and Lie (2006) for probit regressions of takeover attempt success on 
a wider range of control variables, such as poison pills and pension overfunding. Their samples are much smaller 
and of a different character. In any case, given that only two out of 18 control variables in Heron and Lie’s models 
had p-values below 0.05, we felt that it was more important to preserve a reasonable sample size rather than require 
a large set of controls. It is also not clear what omitted factors would be correlated with the dummy variable of 
interest, as opposed to, perhaps, the polynomial terms of the offer price. 
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whether offer prices that are high relative to the 52-week high specifically enjoy an increased 
probability of success. To ensure that c identifies a true discontinuity, we control for a quartic 
polynomial of the offer price.  
The results do indicate a discontinuous increase in the probability of target acceptance as 
the offer price passes the 52-week high threshold. The effect remains identifiable upon the 
inclusion of additional control variables that contain explanatory power for deal success, such as 
hostility (reducing success probability), tender (increasing), and bidder size (increasing). The 
magnitude of the effect is a nontrivial 3.0% to 4.3% percentage point discontinuous increase in 
success probability. The results are consistent with reference point behavior.15  
 
VI.  Bidders’ Announcement Returns 
 We next investigate how the bidder’s shareholders react to the news of bids, particularly 
the component that reflects the target’s 52-week high. We compute the 3-day cumulative market-
adjusted return at each bidder’s announcement and assess its sensitivity to the offer premium  
itittt ebOfferar ++=+→− 11  
.
 
(4)
 
We start with OLS but we are more interested in IV slope estimates in which the 52-week high is 
used as an instrument for the offer price. In particular, we use Eq. (2) as the first stage.  
 Table 8 shows the results of both approaches.16 Not surprisingly, the least-squares 
estimates indicate that bidding shareholders react more negatively as the offer premium 
increases. The magnitude of this effect is not overwhelming, as the third specification indicates 
that a 10% increase in the offer premium is associated with a 0.2% (20 basis points) lower bidder 
announcement effect. One way to think about this small effect is that particularly good 
combinations of bidders and targets may warrant a high offer premium. If so, the market in 
general and bidder shareholders in particular recognize that a 10% higher offer price does not 
mean 10% overpayment. Rather, the higher offer price reflects the omitted effect of deal quality. 
However, bidders’ shareholders are considerably more disappointed about the component 
of the offer price that depends on a historical reference point. The last IV regression implies that 
when the component of the offer premium driven by the 52-week high increases by 10%, the 
                                                 
15 More tentatively, taking the results at face value, they would suggest that the success of between 224 and 322 out 
of a total 7,498 offers may have been affected by whether the offer price fell above this threshold. 
16 Note that the sample in Table 8 is smaller than in previous analyses because we are limited by the availability of 
the bidder’s announcement return (recall that our sample is not limited to publicly-traded bidders, only publicly-
traded targets).  
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bidder’s shareholders react with a considerable -2.2% announcement effect relative to the 
average. This is large relative to the unconditional average announcement effect of -1.5% and it 
is almost ten times larger than the comparable OLS estimate.17  The large difference between the 
OLS and IV results implies that bidder shareholders consider 52-week-high-driven bids as 
overpaying – and that the first stage piecewise linear specification makes an excellent instrument 
for pure overpayment, as opposed to simply higher offers. This distinction between the bidder 
shareholders and other stakeholders may reflect their greater objectivity, given that they are 
likely to suffer less from the anchoring or reference point utility effects of past target prices .  
If we take the sensitivity of the offer premium to the 52-week high as an arbitrary transfer 
of value, we can take another look at the total value transfer for our sample. In the case of bidder 
announcement returns, there is also the possibility of an incremental value loss. The bidder return 
can reflect the loss to its shareholders from overpayment for this deal and also a revaluation if 
shareholders come to expect a bias toward overpayment in any future deals.  
For each the 5,135 deals in our sample that are completed, we multiply the 52-week high 
by the piecewise linear coefficients b in the second column of Table 3 to estimate the component 
of the offer premium that is driven by the 52-week high as before. We then multiply this effect 
on the offer premium by the coefficient b in the third column of Table 8 to determine the bidder 
announcement return. To convert this to dollars, we multiply this quantity by the bidder market 
capitalization at t-2 to arrive at the value transferred or lost. The total is $757 billion, $147.5 
million per deal, or 4.2 times the simple value transfer. This suggests either a market 
overreaction or an incremental value loss stemming from a realization that the bidder 
management has a tendency to overbid. Again, these economic significance calculations include 
only the effect of the 52-week high price, not other peak prices. However, obviously, they are 
subject to considerable error. 
 
VII. Merger Waves 
 We have documented that a given deal is more likely to go through if the bidder offers at 
least the target’s 52-week high. But whether an offer appears in the first place depends on market 
valuations. A bidder will all else equal find it easier to pay the 52-week high when it is at a 
                                                 
17 Our results on unconditional announcement effects resemble those of Officer (2003). See Betton et al. (2008) for a 
review of more than one dozen studies of bidder announcement returns—the range of results is surprisingly large.  
 22 
relatively small premium to current prices. A merger requires both an offer and its acceptance, so 
a reference point channel may help to explain the coincidence of aggregate merger waves and 
stock market valuations: 52-week high reference prices for targets will generally be more 
affordable to bidders, relative to current prices, when the market has recently done well.  
 Those who are most knowledgeable about merger dynamics describe precisely this 
mechanism. For example, in April 2010 the head of investment banking at J.P. Morgan cited 
several reasons to expect an increase in merger activity from prevailing levels. Among them was 
the fact that “the gap between buyers and sellers has narrowed. At last year’s Tulane conference, 
Mr. Braunstein pointed out, many of the companies in the S&P had share prices that were within 
10% of the 52-week low. Now, many of those companies are within 10% of the 52-week high. 
That means sellers are more likely to believe they can get a fair value for their companies, while 
buyers won’t have to shell out hefty premiums to narrow the price gap” (Corkery (2010)). 
 To test for an effect of reference point prices on aggregate merger activity, we study 
quarterly data on the number of mergers from Mergerstat Review 1973 through 2007 and 
examine its sensitivity to the 52-week market index high price.  
ttt eWkHibaMergers ++= −3052  (5) 
We normalize the raw number of mergers by the total number of firms on the NYSE and then 
detrend by subtracting the average normalized level of quarterly merger activity over the trailing 
two and one-half year period starting before the 365 calendar days over which the market’s 52-
week high is calculated (thus, ten data points are involved in the detrending). The Mergerstat 
data include all mergers involving public and private firms, so the annual total is often more than 
100% of the firms on the NYSE. The 52-week market index high price, now measured at 
quarterly frequency, is again calculated from CRSP. Our analysis here is not meant to constitute 
a full investigation of all aspects of merger waves, but rather to look for any evidence that might 
suggest a role for peak prices. For detailed investigations of merger waves, see Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2004) and Harford (2005).  
 The first regression in Table 9 shows that the market 52-week high is a negative predictor 
of quarterly merger activity, consistent with the most basic prediction. Specifically, when market 
prices are 10 percentage points below their 52-week high, the merger rate falls by 18% relative 
to its trend. This fall represents 70% of the merger rate’s time-series standard deviation. Panel A 
of Figure 5 graphs this relationship. The inverse relationship is apparent.    
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 We test some finer predictions. We calculate quarterly 52-week high series for high and 
low book-to-market portfolios using monthly returns and value-sorted portfolios constructed by 
Ken French. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) explain 
acquisitions in terms of market timing, with richly-valued bidders pursuing lower-valued targets, 
and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and Dong et al. (2006), among others, confirm that targets do 
indeed have higher book-to-market ratios than bidders. Forming these portfolios thus allows us, 
in a rough way, to separate firms that are relatively more likely to be targets from those more 
likely to be bidders, which allows us to add a cross-sectional dimension to the analysis. For 
simplicity, we refer below to low book-to-market firms as “bidders” and high book-to-market 
firms as “targets,” while recognizing that the classifications are extremely coarse.  
 The next column shows that the decline in the merger rate associated with reference point 
prices is even stronger when one calculates the reference price of targets alone. This is shown in 
Panel B of Figure 5. This result is unaffected by including the contemporaneous valuation level 
of bidders, which is important for identifying an effect of the reference point theory incremental 
to the market timing theory or any other explanation that predicts merger activity is positively 
correlated with recent returns.  
 The remaining columns test further aspects of robustness. We include both the 52-week 
high of bidding firms and the valuation level of target firms. Consistent with predictions, these 
variables are unimportant in themselves and, more importantly, they do not alter inferences about 
the importance of bidders’ reference prices. Finally, we control for lagged monthly returns, 
which again have no effect on key inferences. This indicates that it is the specific drop from the 
52-week high that matters, not the past return over any fixed past interval. Overall, the results 
suggest that the reference point view helps to explain why merger waves arise and coincide with 
stock market valuations and recent returns. 
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
 We study the effect of the target’s past peak prices on various aspects of merger and 
acquisition activity. We find that recent peak prices help to explain the bidder’s offer price;  
bidder announcement effects; deal success; and, more speculatively, merger waves. From an 
allocational perspective, the effect on deal success is particularly interesting, in that it constitutes 
a real effect through the distribution of capital across investment opportunities.  
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The results of various falsification tests and robustness tests suggest that these effects are 
not, as a group, easily reconciled with standard theories of mergers. Rather, we believe that the 
most natural explanation is that reference point prices play a role in mergers-related decisions, 
similar to their previously-documented roles in the contexts of real estate pricing, institutional 
and individual stock trading, IPO underpricing, option exercises, and other settings.  
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Table 1. Sample. The sample consists of merger or acquisition announcements. We start with 23,350 unique deals from Thomson 
Financial, where the announcement date is between January 1, 1984, and December 31, 2007, where the target is a public company, 
where the offer price is not missing, and where the bidder purchased at least 85% of the target firm shares outstanding or the 
percentage of shares acquired is unknown. Of these, we were able to compute 52-week high prices from CRSP for a final sample of 
7,498. We have information on whether the offer is a tender offer and whether the bidder is a financial buyer from Thomson for all 
deals. We have information on whether the form of payment is cash, stock, or other, whether the deal is completed or withdrawn, and 
whether the bidder attitude is hostile, friendly, or neutral from Thomson for a subset of deals. 
 
    Form of Payment Attitude Completed  
Year 
Total 
Deals 
Log Offer 
Premium  
% Tender Cash Stock Other Friendly Hostile Yes No ? LBO 
1984 221 29.9 61      115 97 9 3 
1985 241 25.5 67      121 93 27 2 
1986 260 28.2 98      152 93 14 3 
1987 284 27.9 82      153 112 19 4 
1988 450 35.2 160      219 194 34 8 
1989 330 27.0 94      158 129 41 1 
1990 179 35.0 30      91 63 17 4 
1991 135 38.2 10 1 3 0 4 0 77 44 10 0 
1992 149 33.8 9 6 14 5 23 1 92 33 6 1 
1993 201 32.5 23 18 22 11 51 0 125 52 12 2 
1994 285 30.5 42 32 56 20 106 2 187 77 14 0 
1995 357 29.3 64 81 112 40 224 9 256 86 13 2 
1996 375 27.7 53 77 133 75 277 8 282 72 18 6 
1997 473 27.6 94 103 187 95 376 9 374 81 17 11 
1998 520 28.8 98 131 206 103 430 10 417 90 13 10 
1999 612 34.5 139 200 203 129 503 27 474 106 28 17 
2000 516 37.3 126 202 159 101 430 30 377 101 32 15 
2001 334 38.3 80 126 94 90 294 13 267 44 22 2 
2002 229 33.0 44 110 40 61 188 22 159 47 20 3 
2003 237 27.2 39 122 51 52 204 21 181 40 14 6 
2004 221 22.4 18 94 59 60 199 13 184 26 8 8 
2005 256 22.7 26 150 37 63 226 23 204 33 18 16 
2006 313 22.5 18 202 37 71 291 17 238 34 37 34 
2007 320 21.6 47 203 40 74 300 15 232 44 40 34 
Total 7498 29.9 1522 1858 1453 1050 4126 220 5135 1791 483 192 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics. Means, standard deviations, medians, and extreme values for the pricing of mergers and acquisitions 
and control variables. Panel A shows the offer premium, the 13-, 26-, 39-, 52-, 65-, 78-, 91-, and 104-week target high, and the 52-
week market index high. The offer premium is the offer price from Thomson expressed as a log percentage difference from the CRSP 
stock price 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. The X-week target (market index) high is the X-week high stock price 
(market index) over the X weeks ending 30 days prior to the announcement date expressed as a log percentage difference from the 
CRSP stock price (market index) 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. The CRSP market index is formed using total 
market value-weighted returns. Panel B shows two other outcome variables: whether the deal was recorded as completed from 
Thomson and the log bidder 3-day announcement return from CRSP centered on the announcement date from Thomson. Panel C 
shows control variables. The form of payment (cash, stock), the bidder attitude (hostile), the offer type (tender), and the identity of the 
bidder (financial buyer) are from Thomson. The target and bidder return on equity, return on assets, book-to-market equity, and 
earnings price ratio are from Compustat, expressed in log terms. The return on equity is defined as net income (Compustat: NI) 
divided by shareholders’ equity (Compustat: SEQ). The return on assets is defined as net income (NI) divided by total assets 
(Compustat: AT). The book-to-market ratio is defined as book equity divided by market equity, where book equity is total 
shareholders’ equity (Compustat: SEQ) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat: TXDITC) minus the redemption 
value of preferred stock (Compustat: PSRKRV) and market equity is calculated by multiplying shares outstanding (CRSP: SHROUT) 
and price (CRSP:PRC) at fiscal year end. The earnings price ratio is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat: EBIT) 
divided by market equity (ME). The target’s volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns for the 365 calendar days ending 30 
days prior to the announcement date from CRSP. Target market capitalization is equal to price times shares outstanding from CRSP at 
t-30. Bidder market capitalization is equal to price times shares outstanding from CRSP at t-30. The past two-month and one-year 
target returns are computed ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. Continuous independent variables are Winsorized at the 
1% and 99% levels.  
 
 N Mean SD 5% Median 95% Winsorized 
Panel A: Merger and Acquisition Pricing 
Offer Premium % 7498 32.54 27.92 -3.28 29.39 78.85 No 
13-Week Target High Price % 7388 16.20 19.90 0.12 9.34 56.62 Yes 
26-Week Target High Price % 7358 24.56 29.36 0.83 13.87 86.63 Yes 
39-Week Target High Price % 7296 30.66 36.49 1.28 17.33 106.14 Yes 
52-Week Target High Price % 7498 36.73 44.26 1.56 21.19 125.39 Yes 
65-Week Target High Price % 7052 40.24 47.18 1.68 23.38 138.29 Yes 
78-Week Target High Price % 6889 43.93 51.39 1.75 25.78 151.50 Yes 
91-Week Target High Price % 6746 46.89 53.69 1.79 28.35 160.52 Yes 
104-Week Target High Price % 6570 49.17 55.98 1.82 30.10 165.38 Yes 
52-Week Market Index High Price % 7498 6.72 8.53 0.00 3.19 26.44 Yes 
Panel B: Other Outcome Variables    
Completed 6926 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 No 
Bidder 3-day Announcement Return % 3937 -1.46 8.25 -14.43 -0.81 9.76 No 
Panel C: Control Variables  
Cash 4361 0.43 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 No 
Stock 4361 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 No 
Hostile 4361 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 No 
Tender 7498 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 No 
Financial Buyer 7498 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 
Target ROE % 4917 -0.23 40.51 -62.63 7.45 28.58 Yes 
Target ROA % 5108 0.86 26.42 -35.03 6.41 19.14 Yes 
Target B/M % 5108 66.11 74.46 1.64 48.84 219.69 Yes 
Target E/P % 4971 3.33 45.10 -41.67 3.75 47.18 Yes 
log(Target Market Capitalization) 5108 11.71 1.84 8.84 11.62 14.84 Yes 
Target Volatility % 5108 3.76 2.08 1.39 3.29 7.86 Yes 
Target 2-Month Return % 7498 0.75 25.00 -43.72 2.25 37.81 Yes 
Target 1-Year Return % 7498 -4.01 55.04 -105.61 3.91 70.09 Yes 
Bidder ROE % 2001 7.05 32.44 -32.89 10.88 31.61 Yes 
Bidder ROA % 2048 3.16 15.63 -14.77 3.75 20.24 Yes 
Bidder B/M % 2048 59.30 81.04 0.60 36.94 228.46 Yes 
Bidder E/P % 2029 11.60 47.03 -13.61 4.30 74.57 Yes 
log(Bidder Market Capitalization) 2048 13.86 2.34 10.04 14.00 17.66 Yes 
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Table 3. The Pricing of Mergers and Acquisitions. Regressions of the offer premium on the 52-week target high price. We run ordinary 
least squares and piecewise linear regressions. 
ittiit eWkHibaOffer ++= −30,52
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ittititiit eWkHibWkHibWkHibaOffer +−+−++= −−− 7552,0max50,2552min,0max25,52min 30,330,230,1  
where Offer is the offer price from Thomson and 52WkHi is the high stock price over the 365 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date, with both expressed as a log percentage difference from the CRSP stock price (P) 30 calendar days prior to the 
announcement date. All regressions control for 1/P, and all ratios are expressed in log terms. Column 1 shows basic OLS results. Column 
2 shows a piecewise linear regression 52WkHi. Columns 3 and 4 replace the piecewise 52WkHi with the piecewise 13WkHi and piecewise 
residuals for high prices over periods greater than 13 weeks, which we label incremental effects, for example e1,J, is estimated with the 
following regression: 
( ) +=− cJWkHi ti 25,min 30,  
( ) ( )( ) ( )∑ −= −−− +−+−+
13
,...26,13 ,,130,330,230,1
75,0max50,25min,0max25,minJ
j itJtititi
ejWkHidjWkHidjWkHid  
The other residuals, e2,J and e3,J, are estimated by changing the dependent variable accordingly to be the second or third part of the 
piecewise decomposition of the JWkHi. The coefficients b1,J, b2,J, b3,J, measure the impact of adding the residuals e1,J, e2,J, e3,J, to the 
baseline 13WkHi regression. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by month are in parentheses. 
 
 OLS Piecewise Piecewise Piecewise 
  1 2 3 4 
52-Week Target High Price %:      
 b  0.094***    
  (5.82)    
 b1   0.327***   
   (7.60)   
 b2   0.114***   
   (3.28)   
 b3   0.070**   
   (2.41)   
      
13-Week Target High Price %:  b1,13   0.415*** 0.428*** 
  b2,13   0.157** 0.195** 
  b3,13   -0.159 -0.149 
Incremental 26-Week Target High Price %  b1,26   0.242*** 0.291*** 
  b2,26   0.170*** 0.134** 
  b3,26   0.229* 0.287* 
Incremental 39-Week Target High Price %  b1,39   0.313*** 0.350*** 
  b2,39   -0.028 0.003 
  b3,39   0.080 0.073 
Incremental 52-Week Target High Price %  b1,52   0.319*** 0.369*** 
  b2,52   -0.044 -0.055 
  b3,52   -0.009 0.012 
Incremental 65-Week Target High Price %  b1,65    0.154 
  b2,65    0.056 
  b3,65    0.026 
Incremental 78-Week Target High Price %  b1,78    0.247** 
  b2,78    -0.039 
  b3,78    -0.040 
Incremental 91-Week Target High Price %  b1,91    0.047 
  b2,91    0.087 
  b3,91    0.040 
Incremental 104-Week Target High Price %  b1,104    0.014 
  b2,104    0.131* 
  b3,104    0.023 
Time Effects  No No No No 
N  7498 7498 7127 6503 
R2  0.087 0.093 0.100 0.103 
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Table 4. The Pricing of Mergers and Acquisitions. Regressions of the offer premium on the 52-week target high price. We run 
piecewise linear regressions: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ittititiit eWkHibWkHibWkHibaOffer +−+−++= −−− 7552,0max50,2552min,0max25,52min 30,330,230,1  
where Offer is the offer price from Thomson and 52WkHi is the high stock price over the 365 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date, with both expressed as a log percentage difference from the CRSP stock price (P) 30 calendar days prior to the 
announcement date. All regressions control for 1/P, and all ratios are expressed in log terms. Column 1 includes controls for target past 
returns, measured in logs. Column 2 controls for monthly fixed effects. Column 3 repeats  Column 1 of Table 3, replacing 52WkHi with 
the high market index price. Column 4 includes the portion of 52WkHi that is idiosyncratic to the market index high price in the same 
piecewise specification as Columns 1 and 2. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by month are in parentheses. 
 
 OLS Piecewise Piecewise Piecewise 
 1 2 3 4 
52-Week Target High Price %:     
b1 0.320*** 0.231***   
 (6.75) (4.65)   
b2 0.104*** 0.086**   
 (2.84) (2.44)   
b3 0.055* 0.045**   
 (1.78) (2.31)   
52-Week Market Index High Price %:     
b   0.269*** 0.374*** 
   (4.70) (6.14) 
Idiosyncratic Portion of Target High Price %:     
c1    0.169*** 
    (8.07) 
c2    -0.016 
    (-0.29) 
c3    0.074 
    (1.46) 
Inverse Price 3.675*** 3.721*** 6.561*** 4.292*** 
 (7.37) (9.74) (14.34) (9.21) 
Target Returnt-1 % 0.000 -0.022   
Target Returnt-2 % -0.026 -0.032   
Target Returnt-3 % -0.032 0.000   
Target Returnt-4 % -0.012 -0.015   
Target Returnt-5 % -0.043* -0.016   
Target Returnt-6 % -0.015 -0.019   
Target Returnt-7 % -0.032 -0.037   
Target Returnt-8 % -0.019 -0.018   
Target Returnt-9 % 0.012 -0.008   
Target Returnt-10 % 0.011 -0.012   
Target Returnt-11 % 0.012 -0.009   
Target Returnt-12 % 0.028 0.006   
Time Effects No Yes No No 
N 7172 7172 7498 7498 
R2 0.091 0.152 0.079 0.094 
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Table 5. The Pricing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Robustness. Piecewise linear regressions of the offer premium on the 52-week 
target high price. We run regressions: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ittititiit eWkHibWkHibWkHibaOffer +−+−++= −−− 7552,0max50,2552min,0max25,52min 30,330,230,1  
where Offer is the offer price from Thomson and 52WkHi is the high stock price over the 365 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date, with both expressed as a log percentage difference from the CRSP stock price (P) 30 calendar days prior to the 
announcement date. Column 1 is the baseline (Column 3) from Table 3. Column 2 adds deal characteristics (tender, attitude, form of 
payment, bidder identity) as controls to the baseline. Column 3 adds target specific controls to the baseline. Column 4 adds bidder specific 
financial controls to the baseline. Column 5 includes all controls. Columns 6-9 add the x percentile versions of 52WkHi, in the same 
piecewise linear specification as 52WkHi, to Column 2. All columns control for target past returns and 1/P, and all ratios are expressed in 
log terms. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by month are in parentheses.  
 
 Piecewise Piecewise Piecewise Piecewise Piecewise 80% 90% 95% 99% 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
52-Week Target High Price %:          
b1 0.320*** 0.328*** 0.377*** 0.399*** 0.320*** 0.353*** 0.364*** 0.483*** 0.476** 
 (6.75) (5.80) (7.77) (5.24) (3.63) (4.70) (4.24) (4.03) (2.20) 
b2 0.104*** 0.0995** 0.109*** 0.0781 0.136** 0.048 0.059 0.105 0.063 
 (2.84) (2.36) (2.69) (1.38) (2.01) (1.00) (1.06) (1.43) (0.73) 
b3 0.0547* 0.0751** 0.0783** 0.0316 0.0127 -0.040 0.051 0.165 0.162 
 (1.78) (2.12) (2.32) (0.83) (0.23) (-0.54) (0.54) (0.83) (0.61) 
x-% Target Price %:          
c1      -0.010 -0.027 -0.155 -0.146 
      (-0.18) (-0.40) (-1.48) (-0.71) 
c2      0.108* 0.060 0.016 0.044 
      (1.81) (1.04) (0.23) (0.58) 
c3      0.155 0.015 -0.121 -0.108 
      (1.20) (0.10) (-0.48) (-0.35) 
Cash  -0.0893   1.922 0.001 -0.036 -0.024 -0.067 
  (-0.09)   (1.12) (0.00) (-0.04) (-0.02) (-0.07) 
Stock  1.498   2.565 1.565 1.464 1.409 1.431 
  (1.27)   (1.35) (1.36) (1.27) (1.22) (1.24) 
Hostile  -3.572**   9.298*** -3.628** -3.661** -3.579** -3.581** 
  (-2.05)   (3.27) (-2.10) (-2.11) (-2.06) (-2.06) 
Tender  8.021***   4.922*** 8.045*** 7.995*** 7.906*** 7.977*** 
  (7.32)   (2.96) (7.26) (7.24) (7.14) (7.26) 
Financial Buyer  -10.53***   -6.253 -10.63*** -10.53*** -10.42*** -10.53*** 
  (-6.89)   (-0.66) (-6.88) (-6.84) (-6.75) (-6.89) 
Target ROA %   0.0352  -0.00522     
   (1.32)  (-0.10)     
Target B/M %   0.00525  0.0144     
   (0.93)  (1.36)     
log(Target Market Capitalization)   -1.626***  -3.661***     
   (-5.39)  (-5.13)     
Target Volatility %   0.947**  1.170     
   (2.37)  (1.60)     
Bidder ROA %    0.0734 0.0314     
    (1.39) (0.34)     
Bidder B/M %    -0.00219 -0.00267     
    (-0.29) (-0.58)     
log(Bidder Market Capitalization)    1.618*** 1.775***     
    (6.26) (4.68)     
Time Effects No No No No No No No No No 
N 7172 4152 5108 2048 1246 4152 4152 4152 4152 
R2 0.0913 0.143 0.117 0.101 0.179 0.145 0.143 0.144 0.143 
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Table 6. The Pricing of Mergers and Acquisitions: Subsamples. Piecewise linear regressions of the offer premium on the 
52-week target high price, for subsamples. We divide the sample from Table 3 according to tender and non-tender offers, 
bidder attitude, and first and subsequent offers, successful and unsuccessful offers, form of payment, and first and second half 
of the sample period. All regressions control for 1/P, and all ratios are expressed in log terms. Robust t-statistics clustered by 
month are in parentheses. 
 
 Tender Attitude First Offer 
 
No Yes – No Hostile 
Friendly – 
Hostile No Yes – No 
52-Week Target High Price %: 
b1 0.246*** 0.329*** 0.462*** -0.110 0.328*** -0.0650 
 (4.97) (6.51) (3.56) (-0.94) (6.88) (-0.92) 
b2 0.0751* 0.124* -0.205 0.340** 0.103*** 0.0109 
 (1.83) (1.77) (-1.32) (2.14) (2.68) (0.13) 
b3 0.0597 -0.0201 0.0280 0.0608 0.0485 0.112 
 (1.59) (-0.38) (0.35) (0.68) (1.55) (1.41) 
Inverse Price 3.870***  4.644***  3.667***  
 (8.00)  (7.67)  (7.40)  
Time Effects No  No  No  
N 7172  4152  7172  
R2 0.105  0.126  0.0919  
    
    
    
 Successful Form of Payment Second Half 
 No Yes – No Stock Cash – Stock No Yes - No 
52-Week Target High Price %: 
b1 0.179*** 0.201*** 0.450*** -0.147** 0.405*** -0.150*** 
 (2.69) (3.65) (6.64) (-2.36) (6.89) (-2.93) 
b2 0.133** 0.00300 -0.0227 0.248*** 0.0669 0.0759 
 (1.98) (0.04) (-0.29) (2.75) (1.16) (1.11) 
b3 0.0620 -0.00229 0.0478 0.104* -0.00572 0.0767 
 (1.31) (-0.04) (0.86) (1.81) (-0.08) (1.04) 
Inverse Price 4.021***  4.307***  3.678***  
 (7.51)  (6.46)  (7.34)  
Time Effects No  No  No  
N 6635  3143  7172  
R2 0.109  0.139  0.0929  
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Table 7. Predicting Success in Mergers and Acquisitions. Regressions of the offer premium on the 52-week target high 
price. We run probit regressions: 
( ) ( ) ittiitit eWkHiOffercbOfferaSpr +>++= −30,52  
where S is equal to 1 if a deal is completed, Offer is the offer price from Thomson and 52WkHi is the high stock price over 
the 365 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date, with both expressed as a log percentage difference 
from the CRSP stock price (P) 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. All regressions control for 1/P, and all ratios 
are expressed in log terms. We limit the sample only to those deals that Thomson identifies as completed or withdrawn. The 
first two columns estimate a linear relationship between the probability of success and the offer premium. The second two 
columns use a flexible polynomial. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by month are in parentheses.  
 
 Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 1 2 3 4 
Offer Premium:     
b 0.00109*** 0.000103 0.00116 0.000783 
 (3.28) (0.64) (1.03) (1.50) 
   Offer Premium2   0.00000179 -0.00000760 
   (0.08) (-0.73) 
   Offer Premium3   0.000000232 0.000000105 
   (0.51) (-0.67) 
   Offer Premium4   -3.86e-09 9.93e-10 
   (-0.78) (0.48) 
Offer Premium>52-Week Target High Price:     
c 0.0431*** 0.0319*** 0.0425*** 0.0297*** 
 (2.87) (3.07) (2.75) (2.86) 
Cash  -0.0133  -0.0141 
  (-1.18)  (-1.24) 
Stock  0.00935  0.0101 
  (1.17)  (1.27) 
 Hostile  -0.454***  -0.453*** 
  (-6.23)  (-6.22) 
Tender  0.0251***  0.0252*** 
  (3.59)  (3.67) 
log(Target Market Capitalization)  -0.0107***  -0.0108*** 
  (-3.74)  (-3.70) 
log(Bidder Market Capitalization)  0.00587***  0.00580*** 
  (3.28)  (3.26) 
Inverse Price -0.0110 -0.00978 -0.0101 -0.00908 
 (-1.48) (-1.64) (-1.34) (-1.52) 
Target Returnt-1 % 0.000230 -0.000181 0.000219 -0.000194 
Target Returnt-2 % 0.00155*** 0.000114 0.00152*** 0.0000859 
Target Returnt-3 % 0.00118*** 0.0000122 0.00117*** 0.00000775 
Target Returnt-4 % 0.000870*** -0.000151 0.000842** -0.000145 
Target Returnt-5 % -0.000536 0.000384** -0.000560 0.000370** 
Target Returnt-6 % 0.000620 0.000301 0.000600 0.000277 
Target Returnt-7 % 0.000591 -0.0000365 0.000579 -0.0000409 
Target Returnt-8 % -0.000209 -0.0000556 -0.000214 -0.0000691 
Target Returnt-9 % -0.000246 0.0000338 -0.000267 0.00000176 
Target Returnt-10 % -0.000480 0.000137 -0.000500 0.000129 
Target Returnt-11 % -0.000567 0.000253 -0.000566 0.000244 
Target Returnt-12 % 0.0000920 0.000342 0.0000666 0.000336 
Time Effects No No No No 
N 6635 2355 6635 2355 
R2 0.0148 0.206 0.0151 0.209 
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Table 8. Mergers and Acquisitions: Market Reaction. Ordinary and two-stage least squares regressions of the 3-day CAR of the bidder on the offer premium: 
itittt ebOfferar ++=+→− 11        ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ittititiit eWkHibWkHibWkHibaOffer +−+−++= −−− 7552,0max50,2552min,0max25,52min 30,330,230,1  
where r is the market-adjusted return of the bidder for the three-day period centered on the announcement date, Offer is the offer price from Thomson and 52WkHi is the high stock 
price over the 365 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date, with both expressed as a log percentage difference from the CRSP stock price 30 calendar days prior 
to the announcement date. The first, second, and fourth columns use ordinary least squares. The third and the fifth columns instrument for the offer premium using 52WkHi. Robust t-
statistics with standard errors clustered by month are in parentheses.  
 
 OLS OLS IV OLS IV 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Offer Premium:      
b -0.0186*** -0.0204*** -0.215*** -0.0443*** -0.253*** 
 (-2.64) (-2.74) (-3.48) (-4.21) (-4.39) 
Cash    1.421*** 1.749*** 
    (3.76) (3.59) 
Stock    -1.831*** -1.380*** 
    (-5.14) (-3.37) 
Hostile    -0.229 1.249 
    (-0.25) (1.07) 
Tender    1.124*** 2.560*** 
    (3.10) (4.06) 
Financial Buyer    3.185 0.704 
    (1.56) (0.20) 
log(Target Market Capitalization)    -1.073*** -1.532*** 
    (-7.26) (-6.85) 
log(Bidder Market Capitalization)    0.386*** 0.729*** 
    (4.06) (4.97) 
Inverse Price 0.320** 0.614*** 1.412*** -0.651** -0.0215 
 (2.00) (3.38) (4.19) (-2.43) (-0.06) 
Target Returnt-1 %  -0.00159 -0.00970 0.00413 -0.00922 
Target Returnt-2 %  -0.00846 -0.0120 -0.00641 -0.00538 
Target Returnt-3 %  -0.00261 -0.0225* 0.00799 -0.00121 
Target Returnt-4 %  0.00875 -0.00298 -0.00436 -0.0161 
Target Returnt-5 %  0.0201* 0.00549 -0.00247 -0.0211 
Target Returnt-6 %  0.0166 0.0152 0.0113 0.0121 
Target Returnt-7 %  0.0128 0.00454 0.00307 -0.00539 
Target Returnt-8 %  0.00737 -0.00922 0.00277 -0.0142 
Target Returnt-9 %  0.0231* 0.0187 0.0207 0.0114 
Target Returnt-10 %  0.0268** 0.0211 0.0117 0.00794 
Target Returnt-11 %  0.0174 0.0195 0.00294 0.00136 
Target Returnt-12 %  0.0139 0.00686 0.0222 0.0133 
Time Effects 3937 3750 3750 2400 2400 
N No No No No No 
R2 0.00301 0.0129 . 0.0873 . 
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Table 9. Merger Waves. Regressions of the number of mergers on the 52-week high of different indices. We run ordinary least squares regressions. 
ttt eWkHibaMergers ++= −3052  
where Mergers is a normalized measure of merger activity, and 52WkHi is the high stock price for the market over the 365 calendar days prior to the quarter for which the number of 
mergers is reported. Quarterly data on the raw number of mergers are from Mergerstat Review for the period 1973-2007. The quarterly levels of merger activity are calculated by 
dividing the raw number of mergers each quarter by the total number of firms on the NYSE, as reported by CRSP. Detrended quarterly levels of merger activity are calculated by 
subtracting the average level of quarterly merger activity over the trailing two and one-half year period before the 365 calendar days over which the high stock price is calculated from 
the current quarterly level of merger activity. The 52-week market index high price is calculated from CRSP (CRSP: TOTVAL). The 52-week high B/M and low B/M index high 
prices are calculated from proxies indices formed from the monthly returns in Ken French’s “Portfolios Formed on Book-to-Market.”  High B/M is defined as the top 30% of French’s 
B/M-ranked universe; low B/M is defined as the bottom 30%. Robust t-statistics with standard errors that correct for autocorrelation up to five lags are in parentheses. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
52-Week Market Index High Price %: 
b -0.0181***       
 (-3.03)       
52-Week High B/M Index High Price %: 
b  -0.0229*** -0.0258*** -0.0216*** -0.0351** -0.0349*** -0.0283** 
  (-5.09) (-6.34) (-4.21) (-2.19) (-2.86) (-2.08) 
52-Week Low B/M Index High Price %: 
b    -0.00370   -0.00962 
    (-0.57)   (-1.12) 
B/M of High B/M Index: 
    -0.189   0.0478 
    (-0.65)   (0.15) 
B/M of Low B/M Index: 
   -2.101*** -1.670*  -2.128*** -2.244** 
   (-3.80) (-1.75)  (-3.76) (-2.22) 
Market Returnt-1 %     -0.0108 -0.00937 -0.0141 
Market Returnt-2 %     -0.00900 -0.000946 -0.00227 
Market Returnt-3 %     -0.0142 -0.0131 -0.0141 
Market Returnt-4 %     0.00678 0.00897 0.00881 
Market Returnt-5 %     0.00134 0.00863 0.00848 
Market Returnt-6 %     -0.0170 -0.0134 -0.0147 
Market Returnt-7 %     0.00687 0.00743 0.00841 
Market Returnt-8 %     0.00910 0.0151 0.0157 
Market Returnt-9 %     -0.0157 -0.0139* -0.0156* 
Market Returnt-10 %     0.0147 0.0183 0.0196 
Market Returnt-11 %     -0.00528 -0.00346 -0.00299 
Market Returnt-12 %     0.000162 -0.000119 0.000826 
N 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
R2 0.1005 0.0991 0.3239 0.3357 0.1640 0.3886 0.4045 
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Figure 1. Slide from Cablevision Presentation to Shareholders, October 24, 2007. The management of Cablevision 
recommended acceptance of a $36.26 per share cash bid from the Dolan family. The slide compares this bid price to various 
recent prices including 52-week highs.  
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Figure 2. Offer Price Density. Histogram of the difference between the offer price and the target’s 52-week high price, 
where Offer is the offer price from Thomson and 52WkHi is the high stock price over the 365 calendar days ending 30 days 
prior to the announcement date, with both expressed as a log percentage difference from the CRSP stock price 30 calendar 
days prior to the announcement date. 
 
Panel A: 13-Week High 
 
  
 
Panel C: 39-Week High 
 
 
Panel B: 26-Week High 
 
 
 
Panel D: 52-Week High 
 
 
 
Panel E: 104-Week High 
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Figure 3. Offer Price Density: Discontinuity at the 52-week high. Histogram of the difference between the offer 
price and the target’s 52-week high price, where Offer is the offer price from Thomson and 52WkHi is the high stock 
price over the 365 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date, with both expressed as a log 
percentage difference from the CRSP stock price 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. Panel A uses 500 
bins, while Panel B uses 200 bins. The discontinuities are statistically significant with bootstrap p-values of 0.01 and 
0.00 respectively, using the approach described in Nicholas (2007).  
 
Panel A: 500 bins of the offer price, centered at the 52-week high 
 
 
 
Panel B: 200 bins of the offer price, centered at the 52-week high 
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Figure 4. Non-linear effects. Gaussian kernel regressions of the offer premium on the 52-week target high price. 
ittiit eWkHibaOffer ++= −30,52  
where Offer is the offer price from Thomson and 52WkHi is the high stock price over the 365 calendar days ending 
30 days prior to the announcement date, with both expressed as a log percentage difference from the CRSP stock 
price 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. The first kernel regression has a bandwidth of 20 and has 40 
estimation points. The second has a bandwidth and 40 estimation points. Panel A limits the sample to situations 
where the 52-week high is less than 1.5 times the target price 30-days prior to the announcement date. Panel B limits 
the sample to situations where the 52-week high is less than two times the target price 30-days prior to the 
announcement date.  
 
Panel A. Acquisition premium (y-axis) on the 52-week high premium (x-axis), 0 to 50 
 
 
 
Panel B. Acquisition premium (y-axis) on the 52-week high premium (x-axis), 0 to 100 
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Figure 5. Merger Waves. Quarterly data on the raw number of mergers are from Mergerstat Review for the period 
1973-2007. The quarterly levels of merger activity are calculated by dividing the raw number of mergers each 
quarter by the total number of firms on the NYSE, as reported by CRSP. Detrended quarterly levels of merger 
activity are calculated by subtracting the average level of quarterly merger activity over the trailing two and one-half 
year period before the 365 calendar days over which the high stock price is calculated from the current quarterly 
level of merger activity. The 52-week market index high price is calculated from CRSP (CRSP: TOTVAL). The 52-
week high B/M and low B/M index high prices are calculated from proxies indices formed from the monthly returns 
in Ken French’s “Portfolios Formed on Book-to-Market.”  High B/M is defined as the top 30% of French’s B/M-
ranked universe; low B/M is defined as the bottom 30%. 
 
Panel A. Plot of detrended quarterly level of merger activity (solid, left y-axis) and the 52-week high of the market 
index (dashed, right y-axis) 
 
 
 
Panel B. Plot of detrended quarterly level of merger activity (solid, left y-axis) and the 52-week high of the high 
B/M index (dashed, right y-axis) 
 
 
 
 
  
